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For m&t organisations labour costs present the highest fixed costs. Reward policies 
are therefore a crucial element in strategic behaviour of organisations. However, as 
yet little detailed information- is available on European comparisons of reward 
management, especially with regards to variable pay. This paper will use the 1989/90 
results of the Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project on International Strategic Human 
Resource Management 1 to examine trends in reward policies in selected European 
countries. 
Introduction 
The pay package is one of the most obvious and visible expressions of the 
employment relationship. It is the main exchange between employer and employee, 
expressing the relationship between the labour market, the individual’s work and the 
performance of the employing organisation itself. The pay package serves as a major 
signal between the employer and the external environment, in recruitment and 
retention. It expresses internal hierarchies, defines performance and plays a role in 
motivating and rewarding. 
Reward policies 71ay an important part in strategic human resource management. 
They can provide a guiding link between the individual’s work and corporate 
objectives and furthermore give important messages in terms of an organisation’s 
culture and outlook. As such therefore they should be focused, targeted, clearly 
communicated and integrated with other elements of human resource management. 
However, more than almost any other tool of human resource management, pay 
policies have been the subject of collective bargaining and employment legislation. 
Particularly during the seventies in Europe strong trade unions were able to keep pay 
in the arena of the collective employee relationship. Furthermore, inflationary 
pressures made pay policies one of the key elements in macro-economic policy, 
hence restricting the extent to which pay policies were available as a tool in human 
resource management (Marsden, 1989). 
During the last decade factors such as high levels of unemployment and the decline 
in manufacturing employment combined to reduce the traditional power base of trade 
unions, a trend supported in some European countries by employment legislation 
which reduced the power of collective action. At the same time the general level of 
inflation remained low and therefore reduced the absolute share of the pay increase 
aimed at maintaining real wages. This has increased the scope of employers to link 
pay policies to profitability and productivity. One of the related effects has been the 
ability of companies to introduce the concept of profit centres into wage bargaining, 
reducing the size of negotiating units as part of this process. 
Received good practice in human resource management now stresses the need to 
make pay more responsive to individual and company performance and to remove it 
from the collective bargaining arena into the field of individual accountability. In 
practice this has been translated into recommendations for a greater share of 
performance-related pay elements in the pay package, as a means of both focusing 
the performance of employees in the short-term, through bonus schemes for example 
and of increasing long-term commitment through such mechanisms as share options. 
it has also gone hand in hand with recommendations for the decentralisation of 
decision-making on pay issues. 
The Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project, a research project set up to study trends in 
human resource management across Europe, established how far these general 
prescriptions and recommendations have been taken up by employers in general, 
and- if taken up- how far the new policies are an integral part of strategic decision- 
making. In particular it asked about the level at which pay was negotiated and trends 
in the -use of performance- related pay elements. 
Pay negotiations 
The decentralisation of decision-making on pay issues to more operational levels is 
recommended as a means of allowing a greater responsiveness to local labour markets 
while ensuring that negotiations are more directly related to local productivity and 
ability to pay. The survey shows that across Europe the majority of corporations and 
private 2 multi-site organisations continue to take major policy decisions on pay 
matters at national or international headquarters (see table I). However, the level of 
decentralisation within employing organisations, that is of decision-making at 
subsidiary or establishment level, is considerable in all countries apart from Spain, 
accounting for 30% to 45% of private sector organisations. The highest response to 
decision-making at subsidiary (35%) or establishment level(lO%) can be found in 
Germany which has the most stable and most centralised collective bargaining system 
among the five countries in the study. This is more likely to be an expression of the 
existing system, which places the responsibility for the negotiations of the exact 
implementation of centrally determined ‘framework’ agreements at the level of the 
workplace, rather than an expression of a more recent change to more local 
accountability. 
Only in Spain is the degree of decentralisation significantly lower, 6% at subsidiary 
and 9% at establishment level. This is probably a sign of Spain’s relatively recent 
economic development and the predominance of multinational companies among 
larger firms who are exerting tighter control over their Spanish operations. 
In future years it will be possible to assess from the survey data whether 
decentralisation is becoming a more common feature in this area, or whether- as 
there already is some circumstantial evidence for American multinational 
companies- the European single market will lead to attempts to re-establish central 
controls and unified policies. 
__________----_------------ ------------------------------------------ 
Table 1: Decisions on Pay Policies in private corporations or groups of companies 
Percent of organisations 1 
France Germany Spain Sweden UK 
International HQ 9% 12% 14% 4% 9% 
National HQ 54 43 71 60 43 
Subsidiary 22 35 6 25 23 
Establishment II 10 9 II 21 
Centralised negotiations of basic pay, either through national or industry level 
bargaining or company level negotiations, also continue to be the majority level 
practice in all countries. However, the figures reflect the growing importance of 
company level bargaining, whether it be supplementary to national or industrial 
collective bargaining or independent of it. Company level determination of basic pay 
is the most frequently cited option for white collar staff in all countries 3 (see graph 
la to Id). National and industrial collective agreements continue to be more 
important for manual workers, to some extent expected given traditionally higher 
levels of collective organisations among these workers. 
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France is the only exception, with company level negotiations accounting for 43% for 
manual workers, almost three times as frequent as national or industry-wide 
agreements. A shift to company level bargaining has been strongly supported by 
CNFP, the French employers federation, who, in support of this policy, has refused 
to issue central pay guidelines since 1984. According to CNPF the numbers of 
compariy level agreements in France rose from 2000 in 1982 to 6400 in 1988. 
Similarly to CNFP the engineering employers federation, UIMM, has also not set a 
rate in central negotiations since 1987. This support for local bargaining, however, 
does not extend to managerial staff where UIMM continues to provide reference 
points for salary scales and increments. This is interesting as managerial and 
executive pay in other countries is generally the most decentralised area of white 
collar settlements. It might suggest that the traditionally hierarchical approach to pay 
in France, linked more to educational background, age and seniority, is rather 
resilient (IDS Focus 1989). 
Also striking is the number of companies who say that basic pay is negotiated 
directly with the individual. This might be the expected pattern for managerial staff 
but it extends to between 20% to 40% of employers of technical and professional 
staff in the sample, and even at the level of secretarial and clerical staff a third of 
Swedish employers and almost a fifth of British employers say they enter into 
individual negotiations. 
The Swedish case (see graph lc) is particularly interesting as it challenges the notion 
of a simple alternative between collective and individual. Sweden has much higher 
levels of trade union membership than any of the other countries, with membership 
for manual workers over 90% and for non-manual workers at around 75%. Wage 
rates are centrally negotiated between the two major trade union federations and the 
employers federations, and despite repeated challenges this system has so far been 
maintained, with the support of the government. However, there have been 
increasing calls for greater flexibility and recognitions of different levels of 
productivity in different industries or companies. This has been expressed in a 
growing number of industry level- rather than national- agreements. To some extent 
the system operates by establishing a wage floor rather than the going rate. The 
actual rate is negotiated on top: “Many blue collar workers in private industry and 
commerce earn more through the combination of local agreement excesses and 
individual wage supplements, collectively known as wage drift, than they do as a 
result of central agreements” (Ahlen,l989, ~337). This practice has increased 
particularly rapidly in response to acute skill and labour market shortages, with the 
rate of unemployment below 2% until recently. Whereas for manual workers in 
Sweden, too, the negotiations of supplements continues mostly through forms of 
collective bargaining, for white collar staff rates increasingly appear to be set at the 
level of the individual. 
Variable and performance-related pay 
Individually negotiated pay of course need not be variable or performance-related. 
However, often the two will go hand in hand. 
When asked whether the importance of variable pay elements in the total rewards 
package had changed over the last three years, almost half of all employers, and a 
massive 85% in the case of Swedish employers, said that it had increased (see table 
2). Of course this common trend takes place against a widely differing base line of 
pay practice and differing industrial relations practices which influence the extent 
and definition of variable pay in each country. Nevertheless, to some extent this 
makes it even more remarkable that employers operating under such different 
conditions as in Germany and the United Kingdom appear to be moving in the same 
direction. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Table 2 Variable Pay: A steady rise 
Organisations reporting increases in variable pay elements in the total reward package 
in the last three years 
Private sector Public sector 
France* 51% 18% 
Germany 45% na* 
Spain 56% 
Sweden 82% 9”: 
UK 48% 47% 
-------------_---------------------------------------------------- 
* Question was not asked of German public sector 
The survey established trends in the use of the main elements of variable and 
performance related pay, such as individual and group bonuses/ commissions, profit 
sharing and share options and merit and performance related pay, differentiated by 
staff group (see graphs 2a to 2e). While all of the five countries show a strong trend 
towards variable pay, the degree to which elements of performance related pay are 
adopted varies between countries. The composition of the pay package has always 
been strongly influenced by taxation, especially for managerial staff and this explains 
some of the variations between countries. 
Both the British and French government have encouraged profit sharing and 
employee share options with various schemes and tax allowances as a means of 
making employees more responsive to the needs of industry and of giving them a 
greater stake in the fortunes of the organisation they work for. The very high 
proportion of employers offering profit sharing in France, over 60% for all staff 
categories, for example, is due to French legislation, passed in 1986, which strongly 
encourages it. The legislation was recently amended to make deferred profit sharing 
(‘participation’) compulsory for all companies with more than 50 employees. Profit- 
related annual bonuses (‘interessement’) are exempt from social security and income 
tax. Trade unions voice strong concern that profit-related pay might be used to 
undermine or replace collective agreements on basic pay raises; in response legislation 
was introduced in December 1990 which has limited the tax-exempt share of the 
wage bill to be accounted for by profit-related pay to 15% (previously 20%), and to a 
lower rate in companies without collective bargaining agreements. In the majority of 
companies, however, the importance of profit sharing remains far below that and on 
average accounts for less than 4% of the wages and salaries bill. (European Industrial 
Relations Review, 1990). 
The only other country where profit sharing is widely employed is Germany, where 
60% of companies make it available to their managerial staff. A possible explanation 
for this is the predominance of medium size owner-managed companies with a longer 
tradition of financial participation for senior managers. Profit-sharing in the UK by 
comparisons is not as wide-spread, being available to managerial staff in 35% of 
organisations, and less to other staff. This is in spite of tax incentives and strong 
government encouragement for profit sharing. However, other than in France, the 
government is keen to promote links between annual wage negotiations and the 
financial performance of an organisation. 
Share options on the other hand, discussed widely as a means of increasing employee 
commitment, are an option mostly limited to employees in the UK where they enjoy 
substantial government support since the late 1970s. This support has ensured that 
they are not limited to managerial staff but are available to all levels of staff, 
including to manual workers in almost a third of companies. Comparisons with the 
British Workplace Industrial Relations Survey show that indeed share option schemes 
have continued to grow in the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1989/90, the general 
availability of these schemes almost doubled, from 23% to 53% of private sector 
organisations (Millward and Stevens, 1986). 
Bonuses are a more traditional element in the pay package, particularly for certain 
categories of managerial and professional staff in industries such as financial 
services and retailing. Bonuses are also a common means of remuneration for (male) 
manual workers, with the exception of Spain where the numbers of companies 
employing either individual or group bonuses for manual workers is very low. In the 
first year of our research it is difficult to assess whether bonuses are used in a new 
and dynamic way or whether these pay elements present the relatively static 
inheritance of traditional pay systems, as is the case for many manual workers in the 
UK. For British manual workers bonus pay often accounts for over a third of total 
pay and is supported by elaborate and often rather archaic forms of setting target 
rates. In many cases the systems have in practice lost their individual- or group- 
accountability and are used as a standard way of supplementing low basic pay rates. 
There is, however, evidence in the UK that the importance of individual or group- 
assessed bonus pay is growing for managerial staff, even though often confined to 
senior management. According to the British Monks Guide to Performance-Related 
Incentives for Senior Managers in Large Companies, the proportion of senior 
managers eligible for performance-related bonuses increased from 39% in 1985 to 
62% in 1989 (IDS Top Pay Unit, 1990). 
Individual bonuses seem to be more popular than group bonuses in all countries apart 
from Sweden, confirming perhaps a greater emphasis on team work and team 
performance in Swedish business culture. Less than a quarter of companies in 
Sweden, moreover, provide any form of profit sharing or share option schemes, as 
there is strong trade union opposition to official encouragement to these such 
schemes. The proportion of companies offering bonuses is also lower in Sweden than 
in the UK, France or Germany - even though Sweden has had by far the largest 
number of employers who claim to have increased variable pay. 
Non-cash rewards 
Variations in the composition and importance of benefits- non-cash elements of the 
reward packages- are equally strong between countries. It is by now common 
knowledge, for example, if still somewhat of a shock to some foreign companies 
locating in the UK, that Britain is the only country where the company car enjoys 
quite such an essential status in the managerial reward package. Similarly the 
emphasis in Britain on benefits for parents such as workplace childcare (even though 
in practice only very few companies have begun to provide these), has been met by 
incomprehension in most of the other countries in the study where it is expected that 
such services are provided by the state. The composition of benefits, probably even 
more so than of incentive-related pay elements, is strongly influenced by tradition 
and cultural preferences. However, here, too, a common trend of increased 
importance for non-money benefits in the reward packages emerges between the 
different countries in our studies 4 (see table 3 ). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3. Non-Money Benefits 
Organisations saying that the importance of non-money elements in the rewards 
package has increased in the last three years 
Private sector Public sector 
France 7% 7% 
Germany 38% na 
Spain 36% na 
Sweden 38% 0 
UK 44% 43% 
__________---___------------------------------------------------------ 
The big exception to this trend is France. Whereas in the other countries benefits are 
often a rather tax-friendly way of increasing remuneration, in France non-cash 
benefits are treated exactly on par with money remuneration. This, together with a 
historical preference for “cash-in-hand”, explains the low rate of change in the area 
of benefits. 
The high response rate for the British public sector is a direct response to 
recruitment difficulties, as well as a greater decentralisation of pay bargaining. 
During the last few years public sector employers have felt forced to copy more 
closely the benefit packages on offer in the private sector so that several public 
sector employers for the first time began to offer company cars, for example. But the 
public sector has also benefited in its competition for employees with the private 
sector by relying on its traditional performance as a “good employer”, in terms of 
such basic benefits as holidays, working time arrangements or maternity provisions. 
The Swedish public sector on the other hand, which similarly faced a very tight 
labour market at a time when they were unable to make pay rates more competitive 
with the private sector, has shown no change in the use of benefits policies. 
Merit and Performance-related Pay 
Maybe the most interesting development in the area of variable pay, however, is the 
extent of merit and/ or performance-related pay. Merit and performance-related pay 
here refers to systems where part or all of the annual pay increase is related to an 
assessment of the quality of performance of an employee. Predictably this is most 
frequent in the managerial group; only in Spain is merit pay more commonly 
employed in the professional and technical staff group (in 53% of companies) than 
for managers. But the survey also shows that merit pay is by no means limited to 
managerial or professional staff. The proportions of employers whose clerical staff 
receive performance-related pay are very significant in all countries, ranging from 
30% in Sweden to 60% in France 5 (see graph 3). 
As graph 3 also shows, the practice of merit and performance-pay is no longer 
mostly limited to the private sector. Especially in the UK recent attempts to 
introduce private sector criteria for cost-effectiveness and profitability into public 
sector management and accountancy systems has led to the introduction of 
performance criteria, particularly for pay decisions concerning managerial staff. This 
is particularly so in the health service where local health authorities now for the first 
time have to operate with local two-year business plans. In France, the government 
also tried to introduce merit pay into the public sector but after severe industrial 
relation problems appears to have slowed down its efforts for the time being. 
Again it is necessary to be aware of the contexts in which merit and performance- 
related pay are being introduced. In France, for example, merit pay has been widely 
used as a means of re-establishing hierarchies and differentials after a period in the 
70s and early 80s which reduced these. In Sweden, on the other hand, merit and 
performance-related pay are often seen as synonymous for “wage drift” (see above), 
that is a response to labour market shortages rather than individually assessed 
perforqance. Thus the introduction of merit pay should not be over-interpreted as a 
sign of a move towards a new enterprise culture. Nevertheless, performance related 
pay does break down the collgctive and centralised negotiation of pay and puts 
much greater power and influence in the hand of line managers. 
Trade union membership and merit pay 
The results of the survey clearly show that merit and performance-related pay is 
much more likely in organisatio-s with low trade union membership. Taking as an 
example again merit and perfo.---- Ice-related pay for clerical staff, the incidence of 
merit and performance-relateo is over twice as high in organisations with no 
trade union membership or me17 ,:ship levels below 25% in the UK and France, and 
almost double in Sweden, as it is for organisations where more than 75% of 
employees belong to a trade union (see graph 4). The same general trend of lower 
trade union membership also holds for those organisations who say that variable pay 
has increased over the last three years (graph 5), although the differences are less 
marked. The only exception is Sweden where the relationship is reversed. This is 
probably a result of the already mentioned practice of negotiating locally to increase 
national pay rates in response to acute labour market shortages. 
Line management responsibility for pay issues 
The growth of performance-related pay and of decentralised and individual 
bargaining puts greater responsibility on individual line managers. This interpretation 
is supported by the number of employers who say that the responsibility of line 
manzc’.ers for say issues has increased over the last three years. A:sin, this trend is 
mosr market -:I Sweden where seven out of ten employers say th: i %ne management 
responsibility has increased. It must be noted that the numbers Ire high because 
Sweden has traditionally had very centralised bargaining structures and has only 
recently begun to move away from them. But even in Germany, probably the least 
flexible system among the five countries in the study, almost a quarter of employers 
say that line managers now have more responsibility for pay issues. Perhaps it is 
somewhat surprising that the British response here is only marginally higher than the 
German one, considering the current lively domestic debate on the importance of line 
management control over pay and human resource management in general. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4: Increase in Line management responsibility for pay issues over the last 
three years 
Percentage of organisations 
Private sector Public sector 
France 43% 18% 
Germany 22% 2% 
Spain 45% 
Sweden 68% 7% 
UK 26% 39% 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The results for the public sector, here defined as public administration such as 
government, public health and education, provide interesting illustrations of the 
differences as well as the similarities to the private sector. In Sweden and the UK in 
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particular public administration has been under pressure to become more profit- 
oriented and change its management practices, including in the area of human 
resource management. The fact that in both of the countries the public sector 
response is higher than the private sector response illustrates both the recent and 
rapid attempts to introduce new practices, as well as the low base of decentralisation 
from which these industrial relation systems start out. Apart from the increase in 
merit pay, illustrated above, this is also a response to moves away from national 
bargaining and attempts to make pay settlements more responsive to local labour 
market conditions. In Germany on the other hand the public sector so far appears to 
have remained relatively immune from pressures for change in management practices. 
In summary, after a first look at the evidence, a large number of employers appear 
to be moving away from, or at least supplementing, traditional collectively negotiated 
pay policies in favour of both a more individually determined pay package and a 
greater emphasis on performance-related elements in the pay package. For Sweden 
and the UK at least these trends are not limited to private sector organisations. 
Strategic Integration 
Variable pay and devolution of line management responsibility in themselves, 
however, are no guarantee of good practice, nor of a strategic integration of policies 
with corporate strategy and objectives. 
For policies to be derived and employed as part of a strategically integrated process, 
particularly when part of their function is to change existing behaviour and refocus 
priorities, one could, for example, reasonably expect that they were supported by 
written personnel policies, or at least corporate strategies. This should be especially 
so for those organisations who are increasing the responsibility of line managers in 
this area or who are decentralising the negotiation of pay policies to establishment or 
plant level. However both table 5 and table 6 show that the number of organisations 
who have clearly defined corporate or personnel policies is only marginally higher 
among those organisations who have devolved responsibility on pay issued to line 
mangers than it is among those organisations who have not. 
_______________-__--------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 Corporate strategies and line management responsibility for pay issues 
Percentage of organisations saying that line management responsibility has increased 
(in brackets are the proportion of companies where line management responsibility 
has not changed) 
France 
Germany 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
Corporate Strategies 
Written Unwritten None 
41 (36) 53 (52) 5 (11) 
36 (36) 47 (46) 12 (14) 
39 (46) 45 (38) 12 (1% 
83 (83) 11 (10) 6 ( 6) 
71 (68) 21 (21) 6 ( 8) 
Table 5 shows that only in Britain and Sweden line managers’ greater responsibility 
for pay issued is supported by written corporate strategies in the large majority of 
organisations whereas in France, Spain and Germany less than halve of the 
organisations have introduced these changes with the support of a written strategy. 
----------------_---------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6 Personnel Strategies and line management responsibility for pay issues 
Percentage of organisations saying that line management responsibility has increasec 
(in brackets are the proportion of companies where line management responsibility 
has not changed) 
Personnel/ HR policies 
Written Unwritten None 
France 37 (30) 54 (51) 10 (19) 
Germany 20 (18) 47 (52) 30 W-9 
Spain 37 (37) 53 (44) 8 (19) 
Sweden 72 (60) 21 (31) 8 (10) 
UK 54 (45) 24 (68) 16 (21) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Even lower proportions of organisations support change in line managemeni 
responsibilities with written personnel policies. Moreover, a significant number of 
organisations, especially in Germany and the UK appear to feel that these changes 
where introduced without any strategic vision for personnel management what so 
ever. Of course the mere absence of written policies is not proof of an absence of 
concerted and well-planned policies; nor does their presence guarantee that policies 
are clearly communicated and implemented. But the absence of written policies, 
especially when policies change, makes it less likely that these changes were based on 
strategic conceptions of the role of pay policies in changing or influencing the 
performance and culture of an organisation. 
In conclusion, employers across Europe in the public as well as in the private sector 
are putting greater emphasis on variable pay elements in the remuneration package. 
The composition of the variable pay package varies considerably between countries, 
probably as much as a result of tax sensitivity as of historical and cultural 
preferences. But the overall trend is shared against the background of widely varying 
industrial relation frameworks between the countries in our study. The extent tc 
which this trend represents an increase in strategically integrated reward policies is 
however more doubtful. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Having looked at the evidence I would now briefly like to turn to a more general 
consideration of the implications of the increase of variable pay, particularly of merit 
and performance-related pay. 
Merit and performance-related pay, that is pay increases as a result of the assessment 
of the individual employee, has been seen as a useful, if not essential means of 
ensuring enterprise and profit-orientation. Performance-related pay is recommended 
because it is seen to provide the flexibility to reward exceptional performance of 
individuals within a fixed budget and to assist with recruitment and retention in 
rapidly moving markets. It 
improves performance by setting objectives and, through the process of determining 
objectives, encourages planning and integrated decision-making. It forces line 
managers to spend more conscious time on staff management. It aids cost control by 
linking pay increases to performance. 
Performance-related pay, however, also poses several problems, both at a conceptual 
level and in practice. An essential part of performance-related pay, for example, is 
the performance appraisal, especially for those jobs where targets are not easily 
quantifiable. In many schemes line managers grade their staff against a series of 
competences and targets, using a variety of categories, ranging, for example, from 
“excellent” to “poor”. Several problems arise. Firstly, line managers are often reluctant 
to mark people as “bad”, or even just as “average”, with the result of a general 
inflation in assessments and points allocated. Many schemes take this into account 
now by- predetermining how many staff can be assessed in each group. In a generally 
well performing unit, this might force managers to mark someone with a very 
adequate performance as average, or even below that, with a resultant knock-on 
effect on motivation. As one personnel manager on the Price Waterhouse Cranfield 
Project remarked: “The excellent performers know anyway that they are excellent, 
while the average or below average performers should have been picked up 
previously, and in any case do not agree with the assessment. The result is no 
increase in motivation, with greater discontent and much more work for the line 
managers.” 
This raises the related issue of consistency in the application of schemes. Assessing 
the performance of individuals against non-quantifiable objectives necessarily 
involves some subjective assessment on behalf of the manager. In order to allow this 
to take place in a constructive framework it is necessary for the scheme to be 
embraced by both subordinates and managers and for the scheme to be seen as fair 
and unbiased. In practice this has raised several problems of inconsistency between 
managers and departments, and of resultant mistrust. Personnel departments have, in 
many cases, had to introduce extensive training for managers involved in the process 
and had to devote considerable time to the proper maintenance of schemes. There is 
a danger of schemes becoming very paper-intensive and of creating a new layer of 
bureaucracy when one of the purposes of the introduction of schemes was to 
produce more dynamic environments. In any case there is a relatively high 
administrative cost connected to the introduction of schemes. One ex-director of an 
education authority in Britain estimated that he spent on average 3 days a months 
dealing with problems and appeals related to performance appraisal. 
Perceived fairness also raises the issue of motivation and trust or team spirit between 
staff. In environments where pay was largely determined by progression through 
established and commonly known pay scales, such as in the British civil service for 
example, the introduction of performance-related pay elements often causes distrust. 
Performance-related pay must be discriminatory if it is to work as an incentive. But 
in so doing it is potentially divisive and might prevent effective team work. A board 
member of a German bank said that his company had stopped all practices of 
individual performance-related pay for this reason: should any staff discover that a 
colleague had been specially rewarded, staff from then on would concentrate on 
shooting him or her down. 
Performance-related pay also raises a problem with regards to career development 
and lateral moves within an organisation. Schemes, of course, can be designed to 
encourage the acquisition of new skills; however, excellent performance, guaranteeing 
high merit increases, in general requires practice and dedication and might not 
encourage the risk of moving into a new area. In this context it might also be 
significant that German and Japanese companies, generally renowned for the 
attention to career development and, frequently, their business success, have not been 
as enthusiastic about performance-related pay as other organisations. 
The use of performance-related pay in recruitment and retention in practice poses 
other problems to schemes as it opens them up to uses which are no longer related to 
individual performance. In France, for example, the practice of using merit or 
performance related pay to bring pay scales into line with market rates or take 
account of regional differences in the cost of living, is known as “merit drift”. There 
is a further problem with cost control as increases, for whatever reasons, are 
incorporated into base pay and therefore will be carried over into future years. 
Lastly, performance-related pay appears to be a tool much better placed in times of 
low inflation. Employees expect annual increases which cover at least rises in the cost 
of living. Whereas in theory the logical compendium to merit increases in good times 
would be cuts in pay, or at least below inflation increases in bad time, in practice 
such a.ioute is likely to lead to very substantial industrial relations problems. Once 
high inflation produces expectations of comparable basic rate increases, pressures of 
international competition make’ much harder for organisations to give meaningful 
merit-related increases on top. 
There might be an argument to say that most of the problems above are transitory 
problems linked to the introduction of schemes, and that the benefits of schemes, in 
terms of encouraging and focusing individual performance on company goals, 
outweigh these initial costs. However, as we pointed out above, the extent to which 
schemes are introduced in clear recognition of corporate or personnel strategies is 
doubtful. With the substantial costs in terms of administrative maintenance, 
management and training time, coupled with potential distrust and adverse affects on 
motivation, the question remains whether performance-related pay is really the best 
instrument of changing values within an organisation. In periods of change, where 
employees are asked to take risks and move towards new practices, they provide 
much potential for distrust and discontent. Other policies, such as career planning 
interviews, training incentives and non-money rewards might play a more 
constructive role as change agents. 
Notes 
1. The Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project is a research centre set up by Cranfield 
School of Management and Price Waterhouse Management Consultants in 1989 to 
study trends in human resource management in Europe in the run-up to the Single 
European Market. The research is carried out by means of an annual postal 
questionnaire sent to personnel directors in private and public sector organisations 
with at least 200 employees. In its first year the survey was carried out in Germany, 
France, Spain, Sweden and the UK with over 5000 valid responses. Each of the 
national samples are representative in terms of sectorial and size distribution. The 
survey is currently being repeated in the first five countries and has been extended 
to include an additional five countries, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway and 
Switzerland. 
2. “Private sector” includes nationalised industries(trading); “public sector” refers to 
public administration, such as central and local government, public health and 
‘education. 
Private sector response: France = 1174; West Germany+ 425; Spain = 359; Sweden = 
239; UK = 2015. Publi sector response: GFrance = 102; Germany = 90; Spain = 0; 
UK = 457. 
3. Questions about the level(s) of basic pay negotiation were not included in the 
German questionnaire because German industrial relations legislations governs this 
area very closely. Pilotees felt that the inclusion of relevant questions would confuse 
and alienate respondents under these circumstances. 
4. The survey did not cover changes in the composition or delivery of benefits, such 
as the introduction of ‘cafeteria systems’ for example. For a recent article on the 
concept and application of cafeteria systems in Britain, see “Personnel Management”, 
May 1990. 
5. Comparative figures are not available for Germany in 1989/90. 
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